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By Jan H. Jans*
1.  Introductory remarks
In 1992 I reported, unfortunately only in Dutch, on a study of the function
of the proportionality principle in assessing the admissibility of national import
and export restrictions.1 The central question was what must be proportionate
to what. Must the justification relied on by the Member State (public policy,
safety, public health, consumer protection, environmental protection etc.)
be reasonably commensurate with the interest of free movement of goods?
In other words is proportionality concerned with the interests that must be
balanced against each other when the principle is applied? Or does the
proportionality principle only concern the instruments a State may apply where
public policy, safety, public health etc. are at stake; and more particularly in
the sense that the State may only take that measure which least restricts the
free movement of goods? Or perhaps both types of application are possible?
The conclusion I reached in that article was, perhaps somewhat disap-
pointingly, that the case law of the Court of Justice did not provide an
unambiguous answer. Against that background I argued at the time for judicial
self-restraint in reviewing the proportionality of national legislation. The main
thrust of my argument was that in a situation in which the Community
legislator had not yet proved able to capture complex considerations in a
directive or regulation it was not up to the Community judiciary to set itself
up as a quasi-legislator, using the proportionality principle for justification,
and then subject the national balancing of interests to overly intensive scrutiny.
The purpose of the present contribution is primarily to examine whether
it is now possible to detect a clear line in the decisions of the Court of
Justice since 1992, but also whether the Court has thereby exercised the
judicial self-restraint I then advocated.
I shall not specifically be considering the case law on the testing of
Community legal acts for proportionality. Nor that on the proportionality
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1. Evenredigheid: ja, maar waartussen? Een aantal opmerkingen over de toepassing van het
proportionaliteitsbeginsel in het kader van de artikelen 30, 34 en 36 E(E)G-Verdrag, SEW 1992,
751-770. A Dutch adaptation of this article has been published as ‘Evenredigheid Revisited’ in
SEW 2000, pp. 270, 270–282.
principle in the context of equal treatment. However I shall occasionally
‘borrow’ from that case law.2
2.  What in fact is the problem?
Today it is fairly generally accepted that three elements of the proportion-
ality principle can be distinguished in the case law of the Court of Justice,
even though the Court does not always apply them as such.3 And some-
times the Court forgets (?) to apply them at all.4 These three elements, which
are also encountered in the Opinions of Advocate General Van Gerven, are
the following.5 In the first place the national measure must be suitable actually
to protect the interest that requires protection. There must, as it were, be a
causal relationship between the measure and its object. Not surprisingly this
hurdle rarely causes problems. After all, why should a Member State desiring
to protect a particular interest adopt a measure which is not effective? This
criterion gives the Court of Justice a means of acting against national measures
which are essentially protectionist but are presented as being necessary to
protect a legitimate interest.6
In the second place the proportionality principle implies that the measure
must be necessary. This implies, among other things, that there must be no
measure less restrictive, but adequate, available to attain the objective pursued.
In other words the familiar criterion of the ‘least restrictive alternative’. Possible
alternative national instruments will first be assessed in the light of the
question: would they or would they not protect the interest equally effectively?
If the answer is that they would, the question must then be addressed which




2. Leading cases in this connection are: case C-331/88 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food, ex parte FEDESA and others [1990] ECR I-4023 and, more recently, case C-180/96
UK v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265 and case T-125/96 Boehringer, n.y.o.r.
3. Cf. de Búrca (1994), p. 146, Van Gerven (1999) p. 37, Tridimas (1999) p. 68 and Jacobs (1999)
p. 1. A typical formula used by the Court is ‘that the national measure must be proportionate
to the aim pursued, and that this aim could not be attained by measures less restrictive to
intra-Community trade.’ It is worth noting that the case law on the application of the
proportionality principle as a means of reviewing Community legislation employs a formula
which more consistently refers to all three elements; see case C-331/88 The Queen v. Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte FEDESA and others [1990] ECR I-4023, para. 13.
4. See case C-2/90 Walloon Waste [1992] ECR I-4431.
5. See his Opinions in cases C-312/89 Sidef Conforama [1991] ECR I-997, C-332/89 Marchandise
[1991] ECR I-1027, C-169/89 Gourmetterie van den Burg [1991] ECR I-2143 and C-159/90
Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685. See also Van Gerven (1999).
6. An example of a case where the Court intervened in this way is Franzén, where a licensing system
for the import of alcoholic beverages was held to be in breach of Article 28 of the EC Treaty.
This case will be discussed in more detail below.
I would suggest that this element also covers the situation where there is
in fact nothing to protect. Thus an import ban on a particular product ‘to
protect the public health’ will not be necessary if scientific research shows
that the banned product does not constitute a danger to health. It could of
course be argued that this element falls outside the scope of a proportion-
ality test and really concerns the question of whether there is an ‘Article 30
(ex Article 36) or Rule of Reason interest’ at issue. However the Court of
Justice usually considers this question in the context of a proportionality
test.
The third element of the proportionality principle is generally referred to
in the literature as the proportionality principle sensu stricto.7 In this sense a
measure will be disproportionate when the restriction it causes intra-
Community trade is out of proportion to the intended objective or the result
achieved. It could also be said that this is the proportionality principle in
its true sense. In summary, the proportionality principle concerns the suit-
ability, the necessity and the proportionality sensu stricto of a measure.
It may be asked: what exactly is the problem with the application of the
proportionality principle? You could say that the above three elements
constitute an ascending series in terms of the intensity with which the Court
of Justice can review national measures. Testing the ‘suitability’ of a measure
may be regarded as a normal judicial activity. There is nothing particularly
unusual about a judge examining whether an instrument can be considered
an effective means of attaining its objective. However, determining whether
there is a ‘less restrictive alternative’ is a little more complex. This requires
a, sometimes detailed, appreciation of the degree to which national legisla-
tion is effective in an often complex national context. The third element is
the most problematic, as it requires a balancing of various often conflicting
interests. For example, the proper functioning of the Internal Market must
be balanced against public safety or consumer protection or public health
or whatever else may be at stake. Not only the traditional reluctance of the
judiciary to put itself in the place of the legislature is at issue here.8 This could
be overcome using the familiar formulas of ‘marginal’ review (i.e. was the
legislative act reasonable?) and respecting the policy discretion of the legis-
lature. No, in the European context application of the proportionality principle
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7. Van Gerven (1999) p. 38. Or, as the Court of First Instance referred to it, proportionality ‘in
the narrow sense of the term’ case T-125/96 Boehringer, n.y.o.r., para. 102.
8. This is made quite explicit in the case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
when reviewing Community measures on grounds of proportionality. In the BSE case, C-180/96
UK v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, the Court emphatically noted the ‘discretionary power’
of the Council and its ‘political responsibilities’, following which it concluded that ‘the legality
of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappro-
priate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue’,
para. 97. Incidentally, on this point see case C-331/88 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, ex parte FEDESA and others [1990] ECR I-4023.
involves yet another ‘separation of powers’ question, namely the separation
of powers between the EC as such and its Member States. After all, applica-
tion of Article 30, Rule of Reason etc. is by definition only at issue in a
situation where the European legislature has not taken any action, or at least
not yet.9 A balancing of interests in the context of proportionality therefore
implies that a court first comments on the degree of protection in the
Community and then balances this against the interest of market integra-
tion. And that in a situation in which the Community legislator has as yet
proved unable to pass legislation on the matter at hand and sometimes has
only very limited powers to set European standards at all. In 1992 this given
prompted me to suggest that the Court should exercise extreme self-restraint
when applying this variant of the proportionality principle.
Application of the proportionality principle in the European law context
thus has dual constitutional implications: it concerns the relationship between
the judiciary and the legislature and it concerns the division of powers between
the EC and its Member States.10 The more intensive the Court of Justice’s
scrutiny of national restrictions in the light of the proportionality principle,
the greater the shift in powers from the national legislatures to the European
judiciary.
3.  The Treaty status of the proportionality principle
The proportionality principle is not simply one among many principles; it has
Treaty status. The third sentence of Article 5 of the EC Treaty provides that
‘Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.’ One of the protocols to the Treaty of
Amsterdam contains a number of guidelines further specifying the meaning
of the sentence. However, from the description of the principle in the Treaty
it is clear that this concerns a variation of the proportionality principle other
than the one which forms the subject of this article. Article 5 of the EC Treaty
is concerned with the consequences of the proportionality principle for the
Community. Moreover, it is clear from the case law of the Court of Justice that
the legal basis for application of the proportionality principle in respect of
the free movement of goods is not Article 5 but ‘the last sentence of Article
30 of the Treaty’.11
Even a closer examination of the Amsterdam Protocol reveals only tenuous
links with our study. Under the Protocol any burden falling upon the
Community, national governments, local authorities, economic operators
Jan H. Jans
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9. Cf. case C-1/96 Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251. Albeit subject to the proviso
I shall be making below concerning minimum harmonisation.
10. Cf. Van Gerven (1999) p. 41.
11. Cf., for example, para. 34 of case C-400/96 Harpegnies [1998] ECR I-5121.
and citizens must be minimised and proportionate to the objective to be
achieved. Community measures should leave as much scope for national
decision as possible, and should respect Member States’ legal systems. As much
use as possible must be made of minimum standards, though the Member
States have a discretion to impose more stringent national standards. Other
things being equal, directives should be preferred to regulations and frame-
work directives to detailed measures. Where possible measures such as
recommendations, which are not binding, should be used as should volun-
tary codes of conduct. As I have already noted, Article 5 of the Treaty and
the Protocol are of no direct relevance to a study of the proportionality
principle in the context of national market restrictions. Nevertheless, in a more
general sense it can be implied from the above that the proportionality
principle does say something about the degree of Community interference;
where possible Member States’ legal systems should be respected. In itself
this is an idea which can be extrapolated to the assessment of national market
restrictions. In examining the case law of the Court of Justice it will be
necessary to consider to what extent this can be used as a guideline for
application of the proportionality principle.
4.  Court of Justice case law since 1992
Legal writers have on more than one occasion pointed out the different
functions the Community principle of proportionality fulfils.12 On the one
hand it is used as an instrument of market integration, on the other hand
to protect individual rights. When the proportionality principle is applied
to assess national market restrictions we see both functions at work. On one
hand it operates to prevent ‘unnecessary’ restrictions of free movement; at
the same time it offers a guarantee to market participants that the rights
they derive from the provisions on free movement cannot be violated without
justification.
4.1.  Suitability
The requirement of suitability implies that the national measure must be
appropriate to protect the interest in question and presupposes a degree of
causal relationship between the measure and the objective pursued.
Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear how suitable a national measure must
be. ‘Suitable’ seems to imply a less strict causal relationship than ‘indispens-
able’, while at the same time being less flexible than merely ‘useful’. Nor is
it immediately clear whether determining the suitability of a measure is a
matter of objective appraisal or whether Member States have a degree of
Proportionality Revisited
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12. Cf. Tridimas (1999).
subjective discretion in determining a measure’s suitability for a particular
purpose.
A most interesting case in this connection is Zenatti, which concerned
Italian legislation which made betting on sporting events subject to a licensing
requirement.13 A month earlier, in its decision in the Läärä case, which will
be discussed in more detail below, the Court had allowed the Member States
a wide discretion to decide for themselves what kind of legislation was nec-
essary to prevent compulsive gambling, crime and fraud.14 The general rule
is the one given in Schindler that the financing of benevolent or public interest
activities cannot as such justify restrictive measures.15 Apparently the Court
was not entirely convinced in Zenatti that the Italian measures were in fact
appropriate to achieve the official objective, namely to limit the possibilities
of betting on sporting events. It instructed the referring court to examine
whether the national legislation, in view of its ‘specific modalities of appli-
cation’, actually fulfilled the objectives which would justify it. It added that
‘the funding of social activities from the income from permitted games’ was
no more than a beneficial side-effect of the legislation and not, I might add,
the true objective.
In Franzén, which concerned the legality of the Swedish monopoly of the
retail trade in alcoholic beverages, the Court applied the criterion of suitability,
though without actually referring to it in those terms.16 The Swedish legis-
lation made the import of alcoholic beverages subject to a production or
wholesale licence. The conditions for obtaining these licences were fairly
restrictive. Moreover applications for licences were subject to payment of a
high fixed charge and an additional annual fee for monitoring the premises
concerned. It also became clear that only a very limited number of licences
had been issued and those almost exclusively to traders established in Sweden.
The Swedish Government argued that the measure was justified to protect the
health of individuals against the harmful effects of alcohol. The Court gave
this argument short shrift: it had not been demonstrated ‘that the licensing
system set up by the Law on Alcohol, in particular as regards the condi-
tions relating to storage capacity and the high fees in charges which licence
holders are required to pay, was proportionate to the public health aim pursued
or that the same could not have been attained by measures less restrictive of
intra-Community trade’. Apparently, reading between the lines, the Court was
not entirely convinced that the measures were really suited to the objective
of protecting public health. 
Another interesting example concerning the suitability of a national measure
Jan H. Jans
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13. Case C-67/98 Zenatti, n.y.o.r.
14. Case C-124/97 Läärä [1999] ECR I-6067.
15. Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.
16. Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909.
is the Court’s decision in case C-317/92.17 Under the relevant legislation,
medicines in Germany were allowed to show only one of two expiry dates:
30 June or 31 December. The purpose of the measure was protection of public
health by preventing the use of expired products. The Court held that the
German system, which involved bringing forward the date of expiry fixed
by the pharmaceutical company, was ineffective and was not a measure capable
of protecting public health. Merely advancing the date was not sufficient, as
it did not involve any check on the date fixed by the pharmaceutical company.
As I have said, this aspect of the proportionality principle is the least
problematic. The Court of Justice, like any other judicial authority, is per-
fectly well able to assess the causal relationship between measures and their
objectives. The case law I have discussed seems to indicate that ‘suitability’
falls somewhere between ‘indispensability’ and ‘usefulness’. Moreover, there
is no evidence from the above cases to suggest that the Member States have
any autonomous discretion to decide the suitability of a measure.18 A measure
is either suitable or it is not. Normally the Court will be able to decide the
suitability of a measure, as long as it has been provided with the necessary
factual information by the national court and the parties to the case. However,
in certain cases a further examination of the facts at the national level will
nevertheless prove to be necessary. In those cases the Court would be well
advised to enable the national court to apply the suitability criterion within
a framework indicated by the Court of Justice. 
4.2.  Necessity
A measure is not necessary when less drastic means will suffice. In Schindler
it turned out that the Court was prepared not to test the necessity of a measure
at all, if the matter was sufficiently ‘sensitive’.19 That case concerned a ban
on holding certain large-scale lotteries. The fact that it was a sensitive case
is clear from paragraph 32 of the judgment, where the Court stated that it
was not for it to substitute its assessment of the morality of lotteries for
that of legislatures of the Member States. Responding to the Commission’s
argument that the United Kingdom could have achieved the objectives it
pursued by less restrictive measures, the Court listed the objectives of the
legislation: to prevent crime and to ensure that gamblers would be treated
honestly, to avoid stimulating demand in the gambling sector, which has
damaging social consequences and to ensure that lotteries could not be
operated for personal and commercial profit, but for charitable purposes.
Moreover, it held, those considerations must be taken together. It went on
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17. Case C-317/92 Commission v. Germany [1994] ECR I-2039.
18. When determining the necessity of a measure, the Court does sometimes allow Member States
a measure of discretion, see the next section. 
19. Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.
to add that it is not possible to disregard the moral, religious or cultural aspects
of lotteries in the Member States. These factors justify national authorities
having a sufficient degree of latitude to determine what is required. It is for
the Member States to assess not only whether it is necessary to restrict the
activities of lotteries but also whether they should be prohibited, provided that
those restrictions are not discriminatory. 
In contrast with Schindler is the decision in Familiapress.20 This case
concerned Austrian legislation prohibiting the distribution of periodicals
containing games or competitions for prizes. As the legislation concerned
the actual content of a product, the Court held that this was a measure having
an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction. The legislation was designed
to maintain press diversity, an interest the Court had already held to be capable
of constituting an ‘overriding requirement’ for the purposes of Article 30. The
dispute focused on the question whether the Austrian legislation was com-
patible with the proportionality principle. The Court’s judgment contains a
number of interesting features. In the first place it explicitly distinguished
the approach adopted in Schindler.21 As has already been noted above, the
Court held there that the Member States must have sufficient latitude to
determine what is necessary to protect those who take part in lotteries. And
that it is for the same national authorities to determine whether it is neces-
sary to restrict lotteries or whether they should be prohibited altogether.
However the facts in Familiapress were different: the scale of the draws were
smaller, they involved smaller sums of money and they did not constitute
an economic activity in their own right. The latitude the Court allowed
Member States in Schindler was justified because of the high risk of crime
or fraud. Such concerns for the maintenance of order in society were not
present in Familiapress, which was a reason to subject the national measures
to stricter scrutiny.22 From this it can be concluded, in my opinion, that
the nature of the interest to be protected is relevant to the manner in which
the Court will apply the proportionality principle. Combating crime and fraud
are clearly interests which, even post-Amsterdam, are primarily within the
jurisdiction of the Member States rather than of the EU. This is something
the Court will take into account as far as the intensity of its scrutiny of a
measure’s necessity is concerned.
Unlike Schindler, the Court in Familiapress was prepared to apply the
criterion of the least restrictive alternative. It examined whether the national
Jan H. Jans
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20. Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689.
21. Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039.
22. Incidentally, it should be noted that, because the freedom of expression was also an issue in
Familiapress, the justification also had to be interpreted in the light of the ECHR (see
para. 24). The existence of the ECHR provides the Court with an additional normative legal
framework, as a result of which more intense scrutiny of the national legislation becomes less
of a problem.
prohibition of distribution was ‘proportionate to the aim of maintaining
press diversity and whether that objective might not be attained by measures
less restrictive of both intra-Community trade and freedom of expression.’
Rather than testing the effectiveness of the measure itself, the Court
enumerated a number of conditions to be taken into account in determining
this. It then left it to the national court to determine whether, on the basis
of a study of the Austrian press market, those conditions were satisfied. In
other words, where it turns out that it is necessary to carry out a detailed study
of the market in order to establish whether the measure in question is the least
restrictive alternative, the Court wisely confines itself to indicating the ‘ground
rules’ and leaves the actual examination of the facts to the national court.
An important consideration in applying the least restrictive alternative
criterion is that when comparing the national measure with a potentially
less restrictive alternative, it must be assumed that both measures will protect
the interest in question equally effectively. This naturally implies, first, that
the existence of alternatives which are not suitable to protect the interest is
irrelevant.23 The second implication is that the mere fact that other Member
States employ less restrictive measures will not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that a more restrictive measure in another Member State24 is
disproportionate. Evidently, so the argument goes, the degree of protection
provided in the other Member State is less. But when applying Article 30
and the Rule of Reason, Community law does not require Member States
to adopt the lowest level of protection in the Community. This view is
supported by the Court’s decision in Alpine Investment.25 In that case the Dutch
Government argued that a ban on ‘cold calling’ was designed to protect the
reputation of the financial sector and the investing public against aggressive
selling techniques. Alpine pointed out that there were alternatives, such as
controls imposed by the Member State of the recipient and the prohibition
of cold calling only for those undertakings which had overstepped the mark
in the past. The Court held that such measures were not suitable. Alpine
also referred to legislation in the United Kingdom which imposed less
restrictive rules. The Court rejected this argument, too, observing that the fact
that one Member State imposes less strict rules than another does not make
the latter’s legislation disproportionate.26
Proportionality Revisited
247
23. Cf., for example, case C-389/96 Aher-Waggon [1998] ECR I-4473. This decision will be
discussed in more detail below.
24. Obviously the situation will be different where the legislation in the Member State in question
also contains less restrictive measures, which are apparently equally effective. See the German
Crayfish case, C-131/93 Commission v. Germany [1994] ECR I-3303.
25. Case C-384/93 Alpine Investment [1995] ECR I-1141.
26. Cf. Jacobs (1999) p. 12. See also case C-124/97 Läärä [1999] ECR I-6067, which is discussed
in more detail below.
4.3.  Proportionality 
There are few examples of Court of Justice decisions where the Court has
explicitly formulated the proportionality principle as an obligation to balance
interests. The best known example is Stoke-on-Trent, where the Court was
again asked to give a decision on English Sunday trading legislation.27 This
was because the English courts were interpreting an earlier Court of Justice
decision, particularly on the issue of proportionality, in totally different ways.
This was unacceptable to the Court, which proceeded to carry out the
proportionality review itself. It described the proportionality principle as
follows: ‘Appraising the proportionality of national rules which pursue a legiti-
mate aim under Community law involves weighing the national interest in
attaining that aim against the Community interest in ensuring the free movement
of goods.’ The Court then balanced the interest of employee protection against
that of free movement of goods and arrived at the conclusion that the restric-
tive effects ‘were not excessive in relation to the aim pursued.’
In my note to this decision I concluded that the question whether the
proportionality principle required a true balancing of interests had been
answered with this decision.28 I am no longer entirely convinced of the
correctness of this conclusion, at least not put in such general terms. After
all, I have not come across a similar explicit application of the proportion-
ality requirement (in the narrow sense) in the case law on Articles 28–30 since
then. I do not mean to imply by this that the Court has changed its mind.
What I do mean, is that the Court is apparently extremely cautious about
applying the proportionality principle in this way and that it will take
exceptional circumstances to justify it. Of course, these exceptional circum-
stances were clearly present in this case. It was the fourth time the Court
had been asked to consider the British Sunday trading legislation and it
must be assumed that by this time the Court had acquired a full apprecia-
tion of the situation, even in the national context. To ensure that the English
courts did not apply the European case law in a non-uniform manner again,
the Court was basically obliged to carry out a full review of the proportion-
ality of the measure.
My conclusion would now be that, though the Court will not rule out a
genuine balancing of interests in the context of a proportionality test, as a
general rule it will not carry out such a test. This too seems to me a sensible
approach from a constitutional point of view. 
An interesting example of a ‘proportionality test’ outside the field of the
free movement of goods is the Pastoors case.29 In the context of national
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27. Case C-169/91 Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Norwich City Council v. B & Q Plc
[1992] ECR I-6635.
28. SEW 1995/3, pp. 196-206.
29. Case C-29/95 Pastoors [1997] ECR I-285. Cf. also case C-193/94 Skanavi [1996] ECR I-929.
legislation to enforce secondary Community law (relating to road transport)
the Court was scathing in its criticism of the Belgian legislation. That
legislation contained a provision under which non-resident offenders were
required to pay a sizeable deposit if they wanted to pursue normal criminal
proceedings rather than pay an immediate fine. The Court held this
discriminatory measure to be ‘excessive’ and ‘manifestly disproportionate’,
qualifications the Court is not quick to employ. Jacobs considers that this
decision must be explained as concerning measures which gave effect to
Community legislation.30 He does not believe that the Court would have
reached the same conclusion if the criminal proceedings in question had
had no direct connection with Community law.
4.4.  Who decides the level of protection?
The question ‘who decides the level of protection’ is one that goes to the heart
of the proportionality principle. If the answer is: it is for the Member States
to determine what is necessary to protect a given interest, that is tantamount
to saying that there is no room for application of the proportionality prin-
ciple in the narrow sense. The power of the Member States to determine
the level of protection makes the national legislation as it were immune to any
further balancing of interests, or so it transpired in the Läärä case.31
In Läärä the legality of Finnish legislation was challenged under which
the exploitation of gaming machines was reserved exclusively to a single public
body. To the extent such legislation prevented operators from other Member
States from making gaming machines available to the public with a view to
their use for payment, the Court held that such legislation constitutes an
impediment to the freedom to provide services. However, the Finnish
legislation was intended ‘to limit exploitation of the human passion for
gambling’ and ‘to avoid the risk of crime and fraud to which the activities
concerned give rise and to authorise those activities only with a view to the
collection of funds for charity or for other benevolent purposes.’ The Court
accepted these as being ‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest.’
Nevertheless, it was still necessary to carry out a proportionality test, in
other words to ensure that ‘measures based on such grounds guarantee the
achievement of the intended aims and do not go beyond that which is
necessary in order to achieve them.’ In Van Gerven’s typology what was
being tested was the first and second elements of the proportionality prin-
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30. Jacobs (1999) pp. 9–10. Cf. also case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, where the Court of
Justice observed, against the background of Directive 64/221, that where expulsion for life
from the territory automatically followed a criminal conviction for drugs-related offences, this
was incompatible with Articles 17 and 18 of the Treaty. It did however accept that a Member
State might consider the use of drugs a danger to society which would justify special measures.
31. Case C-124/97 [1999] ECR I-6067; see also the similar case C-67/98 Zenatti, n.y.o.r.
ciple. This is quite clear from the Court’s next observations. In the first
place it noted that ‘the power to determine the extent of the protection to be
afforded by a Member State on its territory with regard to lotteries and other forms
of gambling forms part of the national authorities’ power of assessment, recog-
nised by the Court …’. Where a Member State has the power, apparently
exclusive,32 to determine the level of protection a test of the proportionality
stricto sensu (Van Gerven’s third element) is ruled out. After all such at test
presupposes a balancing of the various interests at stake. A test of propor-
tionality in the narrow sense might, given the internal market effects, result
in the level of protection having to be ‘adjusted’. As the Court remarked
‘the mere fact that a Member State has opted for a system of protection which
differs from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the assessment
of the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions enacted to that end.’ Once
Member States have been granted that discretion, the inevitable result is
that different levels of protection must be accepted.
It is also clear from this decision that excluding a proportionality test in
the narrow sense also has consequences for a test in terms of the criterion
of ‘least restrictive alternative’. Paragraph 39 in particular is interesting in
this respect, where the Court notes that the question whether it might not
be easier to achieve the aims of the Finnish legislation with different, less
stringent regulations, is also a matter to be assessed by the Member States,
‘subject however to the proviso that the choice made in that regard must
not be disproportionate to the aim pursued.’ At first sight this would appear
to be a circular argument. However it becomes clear what the Court meant
from paragraph 41. It was true that there were other means of achieving the
aims pursued, but the means chosen were ‘certainly more effective’. The
mere fact that less restrictive alternatives are available is not relevant if they
are not sufficient to achieve the same level of protection. Or, as the Court
put it in paragraph 36, ‘the mere fact that a Member State has opted for a
system of protection which differs from that adopted by another Member State
cannot affect the assessment of the need for, and proportionality of, the provi-
sions enacted to that end. Those provisions must be assessed solely by reference to
the objectives pursued by the national authorities of the Member State concerned
and the level of protection which they are intended to provide.’
Such self-restraint in the application of the proportionality principle is
found only rarely in the Court’s decisions. The explanation is of course self-
evident. The grounds put forward in justification of the measure here
(regulating the passion for gambling, avoiding gambling-related crime, col-
lecting funds for charity) do not as such constitute policy areas in which
the Community could take regulatory action. Such matters only come within
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the scope of the Treaty to the extent they have a negative impact on the
‘freedoms’. In other words, these are policy areas which must primarily be
promoted by the Member States and only in the margin by the Community.
Where the powers are so divided self-restraint in the application of the
proportionality principle by the Court is appropriate.
In a similar vein is the Leifer case, where the Court ruled that the national
authorities have a ‘certain degree of discretion’ when adopting measures which
they consider to be necessary in order to guarantee public security.33 Leifer
was charged with having delivered plant and chemical products, so-called ‘dual
use’ (civil and military) goods, to Iraq without having the necessary export
licences. Here too, the policy areas in question (foreign policy, defence etc.)
are primarily reserved to the Member States. Self-restraint on the part of
the Court would then seem appropriate. In Heinonen, too, the Court took
a remarkably tolerant view of the Member State’s legislation.34 The case
concerned Finnish restrictions on imports of alcohol in the personal luggage
of travellers coming from third countries. Under the legislation it was in
principle permissible to import alcohol on returning from travel abroad only
if the journey had lasted 24 hours and only in very small quantities. The
purpose of the measure was to avoid disturbances of public order connected
with the consumption of alcohol, particularly on ferries between Finland
and Russia and the Baltic States. The Court acknowledged that the Member
States ‘retain exclusive competence as regards the maintenance of public order
and the safeguarding of internal security […], enjoy a margin of discretion in
determining, according to particular social circumstances and to the importance
they attach to a legitimate objective under Community law, such as the campaign
against various forms of criminality linked to the consumption of alcohol, the
measures which are likely to achieve concrete results.’ Partly in view of the limited
nature of the Finnish restrictions, and the fact that they did not restrict
intra-Community movement of goods, but that the aims at issue were the
more restricted ones of Community customs and tax provisions, the Court
was persuaded to consider the Finnish legislation to be proportionate. 
One very specific application of the proportionality principle is found in
those cases which concern consumer protection and misleading advertising.
That the protection of the consumer against misleading advertising is an
‘overriding requirement’ which may justify trade restrictions is no longer open
to discussion. But which consumer is it that must be afforded protection? The
cautious one, the average one, or perhaps it is precisely the reckless consumer
that needs protecting? The case law has by now been consolidated and
accordingly the Court has observed that it is necessary to take into account
‘the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well
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informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’.35 Here it is clearly the
Court which ultimately establishes the level of protection in the Community.
Higher levels of consumer protection in the Member States will be deemed
to be contrary to the proportionality principle. What is not clear, however,
is whether the Court in determining the level of protection carries out only
an objective reasonableness test, or also considers the effects on the free
movement of goods. In my earlier publication I advocated that in those
cases where the Court determines the level of protection, it should do this
on the basis of the intrinsic value of the interest to be protected. And that
in taking that decision the effects on free movement should not be taken
into account. I would argue the same thing now.
A third group of cases concerns import restrictions on products which might
entail a possible health risk. The decision in case C-375/90 will serve as an
example.36 That case concerned a ban on the import of frozen chicken from
France because of the presence of salmonella on the skins. The Court con-
firmed its Melkunie doctrine37 and ruled that where the data available at the
present stage of scientific research did not make it possible to determine
with certainty when the number of micro-organisms on a food product
represented a danger to health, it was for the Member States to determine
the level at which they wished to ensure that human life and health were
protected. The Commission did not dispute the application of this doctrine,
but nevertheless argued that the Greek measures were not in keeping with
the principle of proportionality. It asserted first that the method used to
examine similar products was rejected by all the Member States, including
Greece itself. Second, the risk of salmonella could be eliminated by hygiene
measures and, in particular, by high-temperature treatment. Third, the traces
of salmonella found on the samples taken were well below the minimum
quantity capable of causing food poisoning. The Court rejected all three
arguments. The first because it had no basis in fact. The second because it
was clear from the scientific literature that the presence of salmonella on
the skin may constitute a danger to human health even before the meat is
cooked. And the third because the method used only makes it possible to
ascertain the presence or absence of salmonella, not the precise quantity.
Even if the quantity was relatively small, certain sections of the population are
particularly vulnerable, such as children, old people and people who are already
ill. It followed that the measure was not disproportionate.
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4.5.  The effect of harmonisation directives on the application of the 
4.5. proportionality principle
It is clear that Member States cannot rely on one of the grounds for justifi-
cation once a matter has been exhaustively harmonised.38 However where a
harmonisation directive lays down only minimum standards, Member States
retain the power to adopt more stringent national measures. The question
is what effect the minimum level of protection laid down in the directive
has on the manner of application of the proportionality principle.
Directive 95/29 lays down rules to protect animals during transport.39
Austrian legislation required that animals intended for slaughter should be
transported to the nearest suitable domestic abattoir. Monsees, a haulage
contractor, was charged with an offence under that legislation. However, at
the time of his offence the time limit for implementation of the directive
had not yet expired. Monsees argued that the legislation must be regarded
as a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, and
this the Court accepted.40 In its consideration of the proportionality of the
measure the Court was brief. First it observed that the Austrian legislation
in fact made all international transit by road of animals for slaughter almost
impossible in Austria. It then noted that measures appropriate to the objec-
tive of protecting the health of animals and less restrictive of the free movement
of goods were conceivable, as the provisions contained in Directive 95/29
demonstrated. This indicates that the seriousness of the restriction will affect
the intensity of the test. To all intents and purposes the restriction in this
case amounted to an export ban. The reference to Directive 95/29 is also
interesting. The directive had entered into force even though the time limit
for implementation had not yet expired. In other words, by issuing the
directive the Community legislator had been able to achieve agreement on the
desired level of protection for animals during transport in the Community.
The interests of animal protection had as it were been balanced against the
interests of transport in the directive. Review by the Court against the
criterion of the least restrictive alternative was facilitated because the direc-
tive supplied sufficient grounds for this.41
It is implicit in the approach adopted in Monsees that Community direc-
tives must in principle be considered to be effective means of attaining their
objectives. As the less far-reaching obligations of Directive 95/29 are deemed
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to protect animals, so must Directive 80/51 be deemed suitable to provide
protection against the noise nuisance caused by aircraft.42 This directive was
at issue in Aher-Waggon.43 There the German authorities were in principle
entitled to lay down stricter requirements for the registration of aircraft, as
the directive provides only for minimum harmonisation. However, even if
the Community standards could only be regarded as minimum standards, their
very existence enabled the Court to carry out a more intensive review of the
proportionality of the requirements.
Noteworthy, partly in view of Monsees, is that the Court in Aher-Waggon
hardly addressed the German Government’s contention that, as Germany is
a very densely populated State, it attached special importance to ensuring
that its population was protected from excessive noise emissions. Apparently
the Court considered that the requirement of necessity was satisfied. After
all, if the Court had felt that the directive was sufficient to protect the German
population against noise nuisance from aircraft, it could have settled the matter
on that count.
The Court then accepted the German Government’s argument that its
legislation was ‘the most effective and convenient means of combating the
noise pollution which they generate.’ The alternative, carrying out work in
the vicinity of airports, would entail extremely costly investment. The Court
added that the restriction only applied to the possibility of registering aircraft
in Germany and did not prevent aircraft registered in another Member State
from being used in Germany. It accepted the German contention that the
number of aircraft not meeting the stricter noise standards was necessarily
going to fall and that therefore the overall level of noise pollution could not
fail to diminish gradually. It went on to state that the effectiveness of that
policy of progressively eliminating from the national fleet aircraft not meeting
the stricter noise standards would be undermined if their number could be
increased, to an extent not foreseeable by the national authorities, by aircraft
from other Member States.
In Aher-Waggon the question ‘Is there a need for stricter standards?’, which
is in fact an inquiry as to the necessity of the measure, did not give rise to
problems. The examination of the measure’s proportionality, which followed,
was carried out primarily on the basis of whether there were any alterna-
tives available at all. In fact the German measures were the only suitable
instruments available; because of the cost, the alternatives could hardly be
regarded as realistic alternatives. For lack of such an alternative it was impos-
sible to apply the criterion of ‘least restrictive alternative’. All that remained
was a true balancing of interests. The only consideration which played a
part in this respect was that the German legislation did not impede the use
Jan H. Jans
254
42. OJ 1980 L 18/26, as amended by Directive 83/206, OJ 1983 L 117/15.
43. Case C-389/96 Aher-Waggon [1998] ECR I-4473.
in Germany of aircraft registered in other countries. Nevertheless, this can
hardly be considered a thorough, measured balancing of interests.
Finally it is clear from Società italiana petroli that the proportionality
principle does not figure in the review of stricter national measures, if these
measures do not imply a restriction of free movement.44 This is an exercise
of powers retained by Member States and there is therefore no reason to
test such national measures against the proportionality principle.
4.6.  Who is to apply the proportionality test: the Court of Justice or the 
4.6. national court?
One question which inevitably has to be answered when a case is referred
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling is who is to apply the
proportionality test: the Court of Justice or the national court? Advocate
General Van Gerven pointed out the importance of this question in his
combined Opinion in cases 306/88 and C-169/91.45 I would like to under-
score his view that this question must be answered against the general
background of the relative jurisdictions of the Court of Justice and the national
court. Briefly, this implies that the national court must provide the Court
of Justice with all the necessary factual information and an appreciation of the
national legal framework of the dispute. The Court of Justice must provide
the national court with all relevant information with regard to Community
law and it is then for the national court to apply this to the dispute before
it and determine the necessary consequences under national law. This prompts
me to make the following observations concerning the application of the
proportionality principle. 
My first observation would be that the Court of Justice should only proceed
to assess the suitability and necessity of a measure when it is convinced that
it has all the relevant facts at its disposal. If that is not the case it will have
to supply the national court with the criteria and conditions, but leave the
actual assessment to the national court.46 This will particularly apply in sit-
uations where it is necessary, for a determination of the suitability of a national
measure, to carry out a thorough examination of the precise aims of that
measure, and where an appreciation of the effectiveness of national legisla-
tion in a complex national context is required to be able to determine the
necessity of the measure. It seems to me that the national court is better
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able to do this, and that even preliminary reference proceedings – and this
is how most cases of this type come before the Court of Justice – are not really
suitable for a detailed consideration of facts and consequences.47 The case
law of the Court seems to support the above position. As was apparent in
the Familiapress case, the Court seems to prefer to leave it to the national court
to apply the necessity test to the facts of a case, indicating appropriate criteria.48
The degree of latitude left to the national court is sometimes considerable.49
Another thing that became clear in Familiapress was that, in suggesting criteria
to the national court, the Court may also indicate that if an examination of
the facts leads to a particular outcome, the measure will be disproportionate.
This is a means of managing the risk of an unacceptable divergence of national
case law. Thus the Belgian and Dutch Governments argued that the Austrian
legislature could have adopted measures less restrictive of free movement of
goods than an outright prohibition of distribution, such as blacking out or
removing the page on which the prize competition appeared in copies intended
for Austria or a statement that readers in Austria did not qualify for the chance
to win a prize. The documents before the Court were apparently not clear
on that point, but the Court stated that if the national court were to find
that even newspapers which had taken one of these measures was affected
by the prohibition, it would be disproportionate. The Court can also, as in
Lehtonen, indicate that the national measure appears on the face of it to be
disproportionate, but nevertheless leave the national court free to decide
that the measure is proportionate.50 It goes without saying that in such a
case the Court would provide the national court with strict criteria. 
In particularly sensitive cases the Court of Justice is inclined to give the
national court even more latitude. Leifer concerned the legality of German
legislation making the export of ‘dual use’ goods dependent on an export
licence.51 Although this was not a case concerning an intra-Community trade
restriction, the basic proposition stated in that decision does seem to be
applicable to this study. The German Government argued that the legisla-
tion was necessary to protect public security. Advocate General Jacobs indicated
in his Opinion that although he considered the principle of proportionality
to be fully applicable, as external security was at stake this might prevent a
court of law from applying a strict proportionality test.52 The Court adopted
his approach. It held that the threat to public security is a circumstance that
the national court can objectively verify. It is worth noting that the Court
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did not even supply the national court with criteria with which to decide
whether or not there was a threat to public security. This question was
apparently left entirely to the national court.
As regards the third element of the proportionality principle (the balancing
of interests) I would nevertheless like to suggest a different approach. In the
first place I would be extremely cautious about including this in the pro-
portionality principle at all. But if there should, in spite of everything, be a
reason to carry out a genuine balancing of interests, whether in the form of
a reasonableness test or otherwise, this should be left to the Court of Justice.53
After all, such a balancing of interests implies that it is necessary to decide
what level of protection should apply within the Community. That is a
decision I would prefer not to leave to a random national court.
As I have said, it is possible to make an exception to the rule that it is
for the national court actually to apply the proportionality principle, where
the Court of Justice takes the view that it has all the facts at its disposal
and that no further examination of the facts is therefore necessary.54 These
are cases in which there can be no doubt as to how the proportionality test
should turn out. The Van der Veldt case offers a particularly interesting
example.55 The Court was apparently so convinced that Belgian legislation
fixing a maximum salt content in bread was unacceptable, that it concluded
that ‘the legislation in dispute’ (instead of the usual, more abstract formula-
tion ‘national legislation prohibiting …’) did not satisfy the proportionality
requirement.56 Outside the field of free movement of goods the Baxter case
provides an example.57 There the Court held that effectiveness of fiscal
supervision constitutes an overriding requirement of general interest capable
of justifying a restriction on the exercise of the freedom of establishment
and that a ‘Member State may therefore apply measures which enable the amount
of costs deductible in that State as research expenditure to be ascertained clearly
and precisely. However, national legislation which absolutely prevents the taxpayer
from submitting evidence that expenditure relating to research carried out in other
Member States has actually been incurred cannot be justified […]. The taxpayer
should not be excluded a priori from providing relevant documentary evidence
enabling the tax authorities of the Member State imposing the levy to ascertain,
clearly and precisely, the nature and genuineness of the research expenditure
incurred in other Member States.’ Here, too, the matter was clear enough for
the Court to cut the proportionality knot itself.
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Another example is provided by the Debus case.58 Italian legislation provided
for a maximum content of sulphur dioxide in beer. Italy sought to justify
the legislation on grounds of protection of the public health and of the
consumer. Advocate General Van Gerven considered that the Italian
Government’s unsupported reliance on consumer protection would not satisfy
the requirements of proportionality laid down by the Court’s case law, since
there were measures capable of ensuring consumer protection whilst being less
restrictive, such as appropriate labelling. This could therefore have been
decided by the Court itself. As regards the protection of public health, he
suggested leaving it to the national court to determine whether the legisla-
tion infringed the principle of proportionality, indicating in general terms
the criteria it should take into account.59 The Court, however, found the
matter quite straightforward: the rules in question amounted to a general,
absolute prohibition of all beers with a higher sulphur dioxide content, without
any exception. The disproportionate nature of such a prohibition was also
evidenced by the fact that the rules did not apply to wine, suggesting that
protectionist aims might well have been involved. 
On this point, the Franzén case is also illustrative.60 The Swedish licensing
system for the import of alcohol, and the high fixed charge and inspection
fees traders were expected to pay, apparently bore no relation to the interest
put forward by the Swedish Government of protecting the health of humans
against the harmful effects of alcohol. As a result the Court proceeded to apply
the proportionality principle itself.
A second reason for more active intervention by the Court is where the
national court is unable to reach a conclusion using the criteria provided by
the Court. The best-known example of this is of course the chaotic situa-
tion61 which arose in England following the Court’s pre-Keck Sunday-trading
decisions.62 Application of the proportionality principle by the various English
courts after the Court of Justice’s decision in Torfaen produced different
outcomes because the various English courts took different views on the
purpose of the legislation.63 If the purpose of the legislation was ‘protecting
the health and well-being of workers’, it was clearly possible to arrive at the
conclusion that there were less restrictive measures conceivable to attain this
aim, which were equally effective. However, if the purpose was regarded as
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honouring the traditional English Sunday, Sunday closing might well be
considered necessary. From this it is clear that it is normally for the national
court to identify as clearly as possible the policy aims of national legisla-
tion,64 but that the Court of Justice will want to cut the knot itself in
exceptional cases. 
4.7.  Who must prove the proportionality of the measure?
A question of some practical importance is who bears the burden of proving
the proportionality or otherwise of the national measure? In fact there are
two questions at issue:
– who must provide the proof? The Member State? And what is the
Commission’s role, especially if proportionality is raised in infringement
proceedings and not in preliminary referral proceedings?
– what must be proved? The proportionality of the measure, or the absence
of disproportionality?
Theoretically the answer should be that once it has been established that
the national measure is a measure having equivalent effect, it is for the Member
State to prove that it is proportionate. Krämer makes it clear that the picture
is somewhat more complicated and varied in practice.65 During the pro-
ceedings all parties, the Commission, the Member State, the parties,
intervening Member States, and sometimes even the Council, present facts
and circumstances (scientific reports, practice elsewhere etc.) which shed
light on the proportionality or otherwise of the measure. As Krämer puts it,
‘the more substantiated the arguments from the one side are, the more detailed
those from the other side have to be’. Only at the end of this process, where
factual aspects remain open, does the question of the burden of proof arise.
Krämer’s point is largely supported by the case law I have consulted. Take
for example the German Crayfish case.66 This case concerned an absolute
ban on the import of crayfish. The aim of the rules was to protect native
crayfish in Germany from crayfish disease and prevent faunal distortion.
The Court held that less restrictive instruments were conceivable and that
the measure was therefore disproportionate. In doing so, it adopted a number
of suggestions from the Commission, concerning which the German
Government had ‘not convincingly shown that such measures, involving less
serious restrictions for intra-Community trade, were incapable of effectively
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protecting the interests pleaded.’ In other words, though the Commission
was not actually required to prove that the measure was disproportionate, it
nevertheless by its comments and suggestions more less obliged the German
Government to respond seriously to them. Failing an adequate rebuttal of
the Commission’s suggestions, the Court was able to arrive at the conclu-
sion that less restrictive alternatives were conceivable.
Another good example is the decision in the Heinonen case.67 The Finnish
Government had argued that it was possible to detect an improvement in
the situation (disturbances of public order) as soon as the legislation at issue
was implemented. Apparently this was not a matter for further discussion with
the Commission because the Court had little difficulty in concluding that
‘it may properly be inferred … that the legislation in question is appro-
priate.’
A similar approach was adopted in a case concerning Italian nematode
larvae.68 This case concerned the systematic inspection of imported fish for
the presence of certain nematode larvae. It was not disputed that the measures
were intended to protect public health. However, referring to its decision in
De Peijper, the Court noted that the measure did not fall within the excep-
tion specified by Article 30 if the health and life of humans could be as
effectively protected by measures which restricted intra-Community trade
less.69 In the Italian case the goods had already undergone a health check in
the State of dispatch. The Commission presented the findings of international
scientific research which confirmed that the ingestion of fish containing
dead or devitalised larvae did not constitute a health risk. Italy was unable
to refute the Commission’s argument, so the Court held the measure to be
disproportionate.
Another decision which tends to underline the Court’s approach is the
Van der Veldt case, which concerned Belgian legislation imposing a maximum
salt content on bread.70 Because of this legislation bread baked in the
Netherlands could not be sold in Belgian branches of Hema, a Dutch
company. The main purpose of the measure was protection of public health.
As the Belgian Government was unable to supply data based on the relevant
scientific research which would demonstrate the risk of too high a salt content
in the Dutch bread, the Court considered the legislation disproportionate.
The Court applied the proportionality principle itself and arrived at the
conclusion that ‘The legislation in dispute’ was therefore incompatible with
the principle of proportionality (paragraph 20).
Finally I return to the Debus case.71 Here too there were uncontested
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assertions by the Commission that FAO and WHO studies showed that the
maximum daily dose of sulphur dioxide would not be exceeded even as a result
of the consumption of beer containing 36.8 mg/l of that additive. The Italian
legislation, which prohibited all beers containing more than 20 mg/l of sulphur
dioxide, was clearly not necessary to protect public health.
By contrast, where the Court desires to leave the Member States more
latitude, it is more likely to apply the criterion of absence of disproportion-
ality rather than that of proportionality. An example is the Generics case, where
the Court held that a judicial prohibition in respect of a patent was not
disproportionate.72 Similarly, in Alpine Investment the Court arrived at the
conclusion that the Dutch measures prohibiting cold calling were not dis-
proportionate.73 Proportionate or not disproportionate may seem a mere
play on words, but it does seem to enable the Court to carry out a more (is
the measure proportionate?) or less (is the measure not disproportionate?)
intensive review.
5.  Application of the proportionality principle within the framework of 
5. paragraphs 4 to 6 of Article 95 of the EC Treaty
The Treaty of Amsterdam clarified and changed the old Article 100a(4)
procedure. Today Article 95, and in particular paragraphs 4 to 6, of the EC
Treaty determine the conditions under which Member States are entitled to
depart from harmonisation measures. This is not the place to consider that
procedure as such.74 Here I shall confine myself to the role the proportion-
ality principle plays in this respect, as evidenced by its first application in
Commission decisions.75
First let me briefly state the procedure: Article 95(4) allows Member States
the possibility of maintaining national measures even after harmonisation
which are justified by Article 30 of the Treaty as relating to the protection
of the environment or the working environment. Under paragraph 5, a
Member State may introduce new provisions if they are based on new
scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working
environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising
after the adoption of the harmonisation measure. The Member State must
notify the Commission of these national provisions, and the Commission must
decide on the provisions involved within six months of notification after
having verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary discrimination
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or disguised restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not
they constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market.
It is clear that proportionality will play an important part in the
Commission’s decision. This is not surprising given the explicit reference to
the Article 30 and Rule of Reason justifications ‘environment’ and ‘working
environment’. If proportionality did not play a part, this would imply that
review after harmonisation would be more lenient than before. This can hardly
be considered logical. Paragraph 6 contains the familiar criteria from Article
30 that there shall be no arbitrary discrimination and no disguised restric-
tion on trade; the formula the Court has on several occasions referred to in
its decisions as the basis for application of the proportionality principle.76
Consequently it is my contention that the Commission is in principle required
to take the line of the Court’s case law on proportionality into account in
its decisions. If we examine the Commission’s first few decisions, we see that
it carries out two and possibly even three different proportionality tests. The
first test is what the Commission calls the test of compatibility with the
‘general principle of proportionality’, which implies, according to the
Commission, that the measures must not exceed what is adequate and
necessary for the pursuit of a legitimate aim. In other word, this is an
assessment of the suitability and necessity of the national measures.
In the second place there is a test of compatibility with the criterion of
Article 95(6), that the measures must not constitute an obstacle to the
functioning of the internal market. The Commission interprets this to mean
that the national measure must not have a disproportionate effect in relation
to the objective pursued.77 This does indeed look like application of the
proportionality principle senso strictu, the proportionality principle as a manner
of balancing interests. From the way the Commission actually applies this
formula we can see that it reviews in a fairly detailed manner the effects on
production, sale and trade of the goods in question. In other words, not
only the effects on intra-Community movement of goods are considered,
but all the implications the legislation has for the functioning of the Internal
Market. In this sense the review is more comprehensive than under Article
30 and the Rule of Reason. However it is worth noting that the Commission
does not explicitly balance these effects against the aims the national measures
Jan H. Jans
262
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77. See, for example, Decision 1999/832, OJ 1999 L 329/25, at 115. Cf. also, in the context of
the application of Regulation 2408/92, OJ 1992 L 240/8, Decision 98/523, OJ 1998 L 233/25,
where the Commission considered Swedish measures to limit the level of noise caused by
Karlstadt airport. The Swedish Government had failed to show that adequate protection could
also be attained with less restrictive measures. On the other hand, compare the Commission’s
view on the precautionary principle in COM (2000) 1, at p. 3. It considers that the Community,
like the other WTO members, has the right to establish the level of protection that it deems
appropriate. It is hard to see why the Member States should not have the same right in respect
of Article 30 and the Rule of Reason.
are intended to achieve. The formula employed by the Commission does
however give reason to suppose that it does not altogether intend to rule
out such a balancing of interests in the future.
A possible third form of application of the proportionality principle is to
be found in the manner in which the Commission decides in the context
of paragraph 5 whether there are ‘circumstances specific to a Member State’
which may justify the application of different national rules.78 It was con-
cluded above in the discussion of the decisions in Monsees and Aher-Waggon
that where national legislation has been harmonised it must be assumed that
a directive must in principle be deemed an effective means of attaining its
objectives. It is therefore appropriate that the Commission should, in the
context of paragraphs 4 to 6 of Article 95, examine why the directive is
considered not to provide sufficient protection for the Member State desiring
to take stricter measures. And it is in this context that the Commission gives
a decision on the level of protection adopted. The criterion of ‘circumstances
specific to a Member State’ is in fact no more than a special variation on
the proportionality theme.
6.  Conclusions
To what conclusions does the above lead? In the first place I would like to
say that the proportionality principle does not have just one specific form, but
is, on the contrary, flexible. Proportionality has various aspects and it is
these which allow the Court of Justice to subject national legislation which
restricts free movement to a more or less intensive review, or not (Walloon
Waste). The intensity of review may be reflected in various ways: the Court
may itself decide on the suitability of the measure (Franzén), or it may leave
this to the national court, providing guidelines (Zenatti); it may apply the
requirement of ‘least restrictive alternative’ itself (Alpine Investment), or leave
this to the national court, again providing guidelines (Familiapress). The Court
can even decide, as in Schindler, that the entire review of necessity must be
carried out at the national level. Equally, the intensity of review may also
be reflected in the question who should decide on the level of protection
(the Court of Justice, as in Estée Lauder, or the national court, as in Läärä)
and who should in fact apply the proportionality principle (the Court, as in
Van der Veldt, or the national court, as in Familiapress). And the Court can
even apply a more less intense form of review when it comes to proving the
proportionality or disproportionality of a measure. Finally, as the ultimate
form of Community law involvement, the Court can decide to carry out a
Proportionality Revisited
263
78. Although this criterion is not contained in paragraph 4, the Commission does apply it when
assessing existing national measures; see, for example, Decision 1999/832, OJ 1999 L 329/25,
at 81.
balancing of all the interests itself (Stoke-on-Trent) or it can decide not to carry
out such a test at all.
How are these differences in the application of the proportionality prin-
ciple to be explained?79 One of the factors that serves to explain why the Court
sometimes does carry out an intensive review and sometimes does not is, in
my opinion, the fact that the proportionality principle has dual constitu-
tional implications. On the one hand the Court is reluctant to substitute its
opinion for that of the legislature, while on the other it is unwilling to take
it upon itself to form a view about topics which are primarily a matter for
national consideration. In those cases it will not carry out an intensive review.
The decisions in cases like Leifer, Läärä, Heinonen and Schindler are notable
examples of this. However, when the Court can be guided by a political
balancing of interests at Community level, as in Monsees and Pastoors, it may
be expected to adopt a more active approach. The Court may also actively
seek other grounds which will justify a more intensive review: the need to
cut the knot, as in Stoke-on-Trent, or the presence or absence of interna-
tional scientific data, as in Van der Veldt and Debus.
Another factor in my view is the seriousness of the infringement of free
movement resulting from the national measure. Absolute prohibitions can
count on a stern reception from the Court (German Crayfish, Monsees), while
less rigorous restrictions may anticipate a more lenient approach (Alpine
Investment). National measures which ‘only’ infringe Community customs law
or the movement of goods in respect of third countries may, it seems, also
receive more lenient treatment as far as proportionality is concerned (Leifer
and Heinonen). In other words, the nature and seriousness of the Community
interests which are infringed are also relevant to the severity of the test.
In summary, there is no such thing as the application of the proportion-
ality principle. The proportionality principle is an instrument which allows
the Court of Justice to make a balanced assessment of the legality of national
restrictions of free movement and, in doing so, to take account of the sen-
sitive nature of the division of powers between judiciary and legislature and
between the EC and its Member States.
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